In this paper we use the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey between 1996 and 2002 to investigate the impact of the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) on insurance coverage for children. We explore a range of alternative estimation strategies, including instrumental variables and difference-in-trends models. We find that SCHIP had a significant impact in decreasing uninsurance and increasing public insurance for both children targeted by SCHIP and those eligible for Medicaid. With respect to changes in private coverage our results are less conclusive: some specifications resulted in no significant effect of SCHIP on private insurance coverage, while others showed significant decreases in private insurance. Associated estimates of SCHIP crowd-out had wide confidence intervals and were sensitive to estimation strategy.
The Impact of SCHIP on Insurance Coverage of Children
In this paper we use the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey between 1996 and 2002 to investigate the impact of the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) on insurance coverage for children. We explore a range of alternative estimation strategies, including instrumental variables and difference-in-trends models. We find that SCHIP had a significant impact in decreasing uninsurance and increasing public insurance for both children targeted by SCHIP and those eligible for Medicaid. With respect to changes in private coverage our results are less conclusive: some specifications resulted in no significant effect of SCHIP on private insurance coverage, while others showed significant decreases in private insurance. Associated estimates of SCHIP crowd-out had wide confidence intervals and were sensitive to estimation strategy.
Since the late 1980s, federal and state governments have worked together to achieve dramatic expansions in children's eligibility for free or highly subsidized public coverage. Between 1987 and 1996, the poverty-related Medicaid expansions for pregnant women and children increased the percentage of all children who were eligible for public coverage from 18.7% (Banthin and Selden 2003) to 28.6% (Selden, Hudson, and Banthin 2004) . By 2002, higher eligibility thresholds associated with the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) increased the percentage of all children who were income eligible for public coverage to 47.1% (Selden, Hudson, and Banthin 2004) . 1 A growing body of research offers insights into the benefits of these expansions in terms of coverage, access to care, health, and financial burdens. Certainly the expansions helped to turn the tide of rising uninsurance among children. Among children targeted by the Medicaid expansions, the percentage lacking coverage for the entire year fell from 26% in 1987 to 16.1% in 1996, compared to rising rates of uninsurance among children in the next higher income range (Banthin and Selden 2003; Cutler and Gruber 1996b) . Moreover, expanded Medicaid eligibility increased preventive care and hospitalizations, while reducing infant mortality and the frequency of low birthweight babies (Currie and Gruber 1996; Gruber 1997; Kaestner, Racine, and Joyce 2000) . Children gaining eligibility through the poverty-related Medicaid expansions also had increased physician office visits and dental visits, and decreased family health expenditure burdens (Banthin and Selden 2003; Cutler and Gruber 1996a) . 2 Not only has expanded public coverage had measurable benefits, but the cost of the expansions generally has been low. Children are far less expensive to cover than most other enrollees in public coverage (especially seniors and people with disabilities). Moreover, one must focus on program costs net of public expenditures in the absence of the expansions. Had the expansions not occurred, many of the highest cost children -those responsible for much of the total cost -nevertheless would have gained eligibility through Medicaid medically needy spend down, or generated uncompensated care. The net cost of the expansions therefore may be far less than generally believed (Gordon and Selden 2001; Selden and Hudson 2005) .
One strand of this research examines the extent to which increased public coverage ''crowds out'' private coverage. Cutler and Gruber (1996b) estimate that the crowd-out rate for children 's coverage between 1987 and 1992 was 31%. 3 A number of subsequent papers used different methods and data to find lower estimates of crowd-out. 4 Several authors have expressed concerns about the precision, robustness, and policy relevance of published crowd-out estimates (for instance , Swartz 1996; Davidson, Blewett, and Call 2004) . Nevertheless, concerns about crowdout in SCHIP led many states to require that children be uninsured for specified periods in order to discourage holders of private insurance from switching to public coverage. 5 This paper uses data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) to examine the impact of eligibility expansions between 1996 and 2002 on changes in children's health insurance status. 6 We examine changes in public coverage, private coverage, and uninsurance, while also presenting estimates of crowd-out. The primary focus is on coverage changes at the extensive margin associated with rising eligibility thresholds primarily due to the implemention of SCHIP. In addition, we examine children made eligible through the poverty-related Medicaid expansions that occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Takeup rates rose dramatically in this population between 1996 and 2002, prompting us to examine this intensive margin to determine whether increased public enrollment reflects a reduction in uninsurance or substitution from private coverage. 7 Our analysis includes difference-in-differences estimates that compare adjusted coverage trends for children targeted by the expansions versus coverage trends in selected comparison populations, as well as instrumental variable estimates based on a refinement of Cutler and Gruber's (1996b) method. We explore the sensitivity of these estimates to changes in functional form, comparison group, and sample restrictions. Finally, we are careful to provide common measures of statistical significance for our crowd-out estimates, unlike all but two other papers in this literature (Blumberg, Dubay, and Norton 2000; Shore-Sheppard 2000) .
Across a large range of alternative specifications, we find the 1996 to 2002 expansions associated with increases in public coverage and decreases in uninsurance. We also find evidence of declines in private coverage that are large enough in some specifications to generate high crowd-out estimates. Our crowd-out estimates lack robustness and precision, however, and our analysis raises a number of concerns regarding commonly accepted estimation approaches. Undue attention on crowd-out estimates has the potential to distract policymakers from the larger and more important challenge of weighing various program benefits against program costs. This is compounded if the estimates themselves are imprecise and sensitive to arbitrary modeling choices -as they appear to be in our data. We conclude that there is considerable reason for concern regarding the fragility of crowd-out estimates, arguing for caution in developing policy implications based on such research.
Methodology
Our objective is to measure the effect of the eligibility expansions for public health insurance (primarily SCHIP) between 1996 and 2002 on whether children have public coverage, private coverage, or no coverage. Our data consist of repeated cross sections, enabling us to observe eligible and ineligible children before and after the expansions occurred.
8 Measuring expansion effects, nevertheless, poses a formidable estimation challenge. The fundamental problem is that we cannot observe the coverage that eligible children would have held had they not been eligible. Instead, we must rely on comparisons between the coverage outcomes of eligible and ineligible children, before and after the expansions.
Let ELIG be a (0,1) indicator of the ith child's eligibility for public insurance, and let Y be a (0,1) insurance outcome for each of the possible outcomes: public coverage, private coverage, and uninsured. Assuming a linear probability model for the effect of eligibility on coverage, the basic equation to be estimated is:
where X is a vector of other explanatory variables. The coefficient b E measures the effect of eligibility for public insurance on the probability a child is uninsured (b E UNIN ), covered by private insurance (b E PRIV ), or covered by public
There are three main obstacles to estimation. The first is eligibility endogeneity. Eligible and ineligible children may well have different family resources, composition, and tastes. If these are imperfectly controlled for by the explanatory variables in equation 1, then the coefficient on ELIG risks confounding the coverage effects of eligibility with those of the omitted differences. Also, differences in ELIG across children in different states may reflect endogenous state policymaking if, for instance, the states with the largest increases in eligibility are those anticipating rapid increases in uninsurance (Besley and Case 2000) . In either case, the result is ''endogeneity bias,'' the direction of which cannot be signed a priori.
A second problem arises because eligibility is not observed in our data, but rather must be simulated. Simulation errors can arise due to misreported household income and because survey data often lack the information to simulate all pathways to eligibility (see the later discussion). The resulting simulation errors can bias estimates of b E toward zero. As shown in Card (1996) , if simulation errors in ELIG are independent of X and in equation 1, then ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of b E are biased toward zero by a multiplicative factor (see also Card, Hildreth, and Shore-Sheppard 2002) . The effect of simulation error can be quite large. For example, we find 7% of children in families who have incomes between 300% and 500% of poverty and are simulated to be ineligible report having public coverage. This provides a lower bound for the false negative rate of eligible children simulated to be ineligible. If we assume a similar false positive rate for ELIG then the OLS estimates of b E are biased by 64%, and even a 2% false positive rate would yield a bias of 28%.
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Although simulation error may severely impact OLS estimates of b E , note that such errors may be of far less consequence if the focus is the crowd-out rate rather than coverage effects per se. In the case examined previously, in which simulation errors are uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables and coverage outcomes, the attenuation bias term simply can be cancelled from the numerator and denominator of the crowd-out ratio, thereby yielding consistent crowd-out rate estimates (Yazici and Kaestner 2000) . To our knowledge, there have been no studies examining the robustness of this consistency result to alternative assumptions about the distribution of simulation errors. It seems likely, however, that this assumption is violated in practice. For instance, simulation errors are most likely for children with measured family incomes nearest the eligibility thresholds.
A third estimation challenge is that expanded eligibility may have spillover effects on the coverage held by people outside the targeted group. The eligibility of one child in a family, for instance, might affect the coverage of the child's siblings and parents by influencing the family's take-up of employment-related coverage (if offered). Also, expanded eligibility might affect employer decisions regarding offers of employment-related private coverage.
10 If ineligibles are affected by the expansion, estimates of the expansion's effects will be biased even if one's only interest is to observe coverage changes among eligible children.
Difference-in-Differences Approach
The literature contains a number of solutions to endogeneity, simulation error and spillover effects -all of which have strengths and weaknesses. One popular solution to the problem of endogeneity is to exploit the quasi-experimental nature of the SCHIP expansions in a ''difference-in-differences '' estimator. 11 In our data we define a treatment population (TREATMENT¼1) to be children in each year who would be ineligible according to 1996 eligibility rules, but eligible according to 2002 eligibility rules. The control population (TREATMENT¼0) are children who would be ineligible under either set of rules. We also can define a variable POST that equals 0 or 1 depending on whether the child is observed before or after the implementation of SCHIP. This leads to:
where the other controls are represented by Z. Equation 2 can be seen as a special case of equation 1 in which TREATMENT*POST ¼ ELIG, and X ¼ (TREATMENT, POST, Z). In our analysis of SCHIP, we depart slightly from this wellknown formulation, modeling POST as a linear trend term normalized to [0, 1] . 12 We do this because evidence suggests the implementation of SCHIP and the transition to a new equilibrium both occurred gradually over time. In either the difference-in-differences or our ''difference-intrends'' (DT) model, the coefficient b 3 measures the ELIG effect. The associated crowd-out estimate is À b 3
The advantage of the DT approach is that it can identify eligibility effects separately from: any time-invariant differences (observable or unobservable) between the treatment and control groups (the TREATMENT effect); the change experienced by the control group (the POST effect); and any time-varying average differences captured by Z. Although the DT model does not correct for the endogeneity of state policies, the addition of relevant state-level variables on employment, education and insurance offers and premiums can partially control for these effects. The disadvantage of this estimation approach is that it does not correct for simulation error or spillover effects -problems that may be especially acute if the control group is constructed from children just above the eligibility threshold of the expanded program.
The validity of the DT model lies in choosing a control group that consists of people similar to those in the treatment population, yet not affected by the policy change. To date, the literature has focused primarily on children in families with incomes just above those targeted for expansions and on adults with comparable insurance trends to targeted children (low-income single males) (Dubay and Kenney 1997; Shore-Sheppard 2000) . While it would be natural to use other children as controls, children in families with higher income levels had very different insurance coverage even before the expansions. Children with incomes just above eligibility thresholds are also more likely to suffer from both simulation error and spillover effects. To mitigate these effects, we identify one control group of children age 18 and younger who live in families with incomes between 300% and 500% of poverty and who are ineligible for public insurance.
Using adults as a control group avoids the issues of simulation errors and spillover effects and can result in a population with similar insurance coverage trends in absence of the expansions. Despite the obvious differences between adults and children along other dimensions, we define a second control group of adult married women. Specifically, these women have no children under age 19, are not pregnant, and live in families with incomes below 500% of poverty. Married women without children are more like the SCHIP treatment group than single men with respect to the prevalence of dependent coveragewhich may have been differentially affected by rising premiums.
We consider both children and adults for comparison groups in our analyses, acknowledging that the strength of one group is the weakness of the other. Figures 1 and 2 show how the SCHIP target population compares to our two control groups as well as to single men in terms of the prevalence of uninsurance and private insurance between 1987 and 1996. These trends highlight the concerns regarding the comparability of insurance coverage of the treatment and control groups in absence of the expansions. While the treatment group saw increasing uninsurance coupled with decreasing private coverage between 1987 and 1996, the control group of never-eligible children saw very little change in uninsurance and even had a small increase in private coverage. In contrast, we find the trends for our control group of women more comparable to our treatment group, with an increase in uninsurance and a decrease in private coverage. Low-income single men also had uninsurance and private coverage trends consistent with those of our treatment group; however, the level of coverage and the magnitudes of change for our group of women are more in line with the experiences faced by children targeted by the SCHIP expansion.
Applying the DT approach allows us to define a second treatment group of children, those who were targeted by the poverty-related Medicaid expansions enacted in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Medicaid take-up rate among these children rose from 60.6% in 1996 to 77.3% in 2002 (Selden, Hudson, and Banthin 2004) .
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Viewing this Medicaid expansion population as a second treatment group, we can estimate difference-in-trends models to examine whether the continued growth in enrollment during this time period helped to reduce uninsurance or came at the expense of private coverage. The instrumental variables (IV) estimation approach, described in the following section, does not allow us to isolate the effect on Medicaid expansion-eligible children.
Instrumental Variables Approach
An alternative solution to the problems of endogeneity and simulation error is to instrument for ELIG in equation 1. Instrumental variables offer the potential to provide consistent estimates in the presence of endogeneity. IV also offers a correction for simulation error, although in this case IV may likely overcorrect, as we subsequently discuss.
Cutler and Gruber (1996b) instrument eligibility by taking a national sample of children and processing their eligibility according to rules by state, year, and age. They then use the mean within each age*state*year cell as their instrument. The greatest strength of Cutler and Gruber's method is that it excludes many potentially problematic sources of eligibility variation. The model includes year, state, and age effects so that the effects of eligibility can be distinguished from unrelated changes in coverage across age groups, states, and years. Moreover, the instruments are formed at the age, state, and year level, so differences in eligibility within each age*state*year cell of the data are ignored (such as those associated with differences in family resources and composition).
14 Instead, identification is achieved from differential expansions in eligibility over time across state and age groups.
When applied to SCHIP expansions in MEPS, however, the Cutler and Gruber method proved problematic. Although the age*state*year instrument was highly correlated with eligibility in the first-stage equation and yielded a t-statistic of 18.06, the partial R 2 was only .022 and the Cutler-Gruber approach yielded wrongly signed and highly imprecise eligibility effects in both the public and private coverage equations (results not shown).
We also are concerned that the age*state*year instrument incorrectly measures effective changes in eligibility. Dubay, Haley, and Kenney (2002) show that differences in poverty distributions across states can translate into large differences in the effective generosity of a given poverty threshold (see also Shore-Sheppard 2000) . For instance, state A might have a very low income distribution, so that an eligibility threshold at 100% of poverty might make half of all children eligible, whereas that same threshold in a highincome state B might make only 10% of all children eligible. Errors in instruments that are correlated with state income levels may affect consistency, especially in view of the differences in coverage distributions and trends between low-income and high-income states. If the age*state*year instruments capture changes in eligibility with error, and if this error varies systematically across states with different economic climates, then IV estimates risk confounding eligibility changes with unrelated changes in coverage.
For these reasons, we compute instruments not by age*state*year, but instead by age*state *year*predicted poverty*nativity*race. 15, 16 The resulting instruments have greater predictive power than the Cutler-Gruber instruments, with a t-statistic of 45.5 in the first-stage regression and a partial R 2 equal to .077. To predict poverty, we use only variables that are exogenous to state SCHIP policies: family structure, parental education, race/ethnicity, and nativity. 17 We also include a full set of state fixed effects, so that our poverty predictions reflect cross-state differences in expected family income. Thus, a child with a single parent of low educational attainment would receive a higher predicted poverty level in a high-income state than in a low-income state. If the two states had the same poverty threshold for eligibility, then our instrument for the child in the lower-income state would yield a greater prediction of eligibility than for the child in the higher-income state (thereby capturing the greater effective impact of that threshold for the former).
We make two additional modifications to our IV model to improve its estimates in this application. First, Cutler and Gruber include all ineligible children in their analysis, including those in high-income families. Absent the expansions, children in high-income and low-income families might have had very different trends in insurance coverage. Comparing the experiences of these high-income children with those affected by the expansions may lead to biased results. Furthermore, children from very poor families have greater access to and take-up rates of public coverage. We therefore follow LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004) in testing the sensitivity of our IV estimates as high-income and low-income children are excluded from the analysis. Second, the IV approach implicitly assumes that changes in eligibility instantaneously affect coverage. We know, however, that SCHIP enrollment exhibited a substantial lag relative to program implementation. 18 As a partial solution, we estimate our IV models both with the full 1996-2002 sample and with another sample that includes the years 1996, 1997, 2000, 2001, and 2002 (1998 and 1999 , the first two years of SCHIP, are dropped).
Three remaining issues cannot be solved using the IV approach and must be taken into account when interpreting our final results. First, the IV approach does not solve the problem of spillover effects, whereby eligibility policies affect coverage among ineligibles. A second concern is that state policies determining eligibility for public insurance may be endogenous, whereby lawmakers react to the economic or health conditions within the state. Cutler and Gruber (1996b) note that through 1992 the poverty-related Medicaid expansions were largely driven by federally mandated changes, mitigating policy endogeneity as a source of bias. By 1996, however, 23% of expansion-eligible children were eligible through state expansions beyond the federal mandate (Selden, Banthin, and Cohen 1998) . Moreover, the 1996 to 2002 expansions studied by this paper were predominantly associated with SCHIP, a program that gave states wide latitude in program design. The potential for state policies to be endogenous is therefore a very real concern for our analysis. Using an instrument that ignores this fact and focuses on such a small percentage of the overall variation in eligibility increases the risk of magnifying the effect of endogeneity rather than reducing it.
A final concern is that IV is likely to overcorrect for simulation error. Whereas IV provides consistent estimates in the presence of classical measurement error in contrast to the DT model, simulation errors are, by construction, correlated with true (unobserved) eligibility. 19 If we assume once again that simulation error is independent of X and in equation 1, then the IV estimate of b E will be inflated (away from zero) by a multiplicative factor. For example, using the error rates discussed earlier, the IV overcorrection will range from 10.2% to 17.0%. Within the range of values that we believe are likely to prevail in our analysis, inflation of IV point estimates is likely to be a less important concern than attenuation of OLS coefficients in the DT model. Moreover, as is the case with DT, the bias can be cancelled from the numerator and denominator of the crowd-out ratio (under the rather strong assumption of independence).
In the discussion to this point, we have assumed in both the DT and IV approaches that probabilities can be reasonably approximated by the linear model in equation 1. Linearity offers ease of interpretation. Another advantage is that instrumenting for ELIG in a linear model helps reduce bias due to simulation error. We show in the ''Results'' section, however, that linear probability models generate negative probabilities with high frequency. Moreover, we show that estimated program effects are sensitive to functional form -especially those from our difference-in-trends models.
A final methodological issue common to all estimation approaches concerns standard errors. Only two other papers in the crowd-out literature provide conventional measures of statistical significance for crowd-out (Blumberg, Dubay, and Norton 2000; Shore-Sheppard 2000) . Moreover, even if one's focus is only on coverage effects, OLS standard error estimates are likely to overstate precision for a number of reasons. First, linear probability models are likely to be highly heteroskedastic. Second, eligibility policies are set at the state level, introducing contemporaneous correlation across observations within states. Third, and perhaps most significantly, changes in eligibility rules are highly serially correlated (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004) . We construct standard errors in this paper using the method of balanced repeated replicates (BRR). Standard errors computed in this manner capture all patterns of correlation that nest within the primary sampling unit (PSU), including intra-family correlation across children and within-PSU correlation across time.
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Data and Simulation Methods
As already noted, the data for our analysis come from the 1996-2002 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, a nationally representative sample of the noninstitutionalized civilian population sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). MEPS is a stratified and clustered random sample with weights that produce nationally representative estimates for insurance coverage, medical expenditures, and a wide range of other health-related and socioeconomic characteristics (Cohen et al. 1996; Cohen 1997) . The survey has an overlapping panel design, gathering two years of data for each household.
Our sample comes from rounds one and three of the 1996-2002 MEPS, roughly corresponding to the first part of each calendar year. The primary focus is on eligibility and insurance status of children age 18 and younger. As part of our difference-in-trends analyses we also include a sample of unmarried childless women ages 19 to 64. The number of sampled children varies by year, from a low of 4,798 in 1999 to a high of 13,050 in 2002, for a total of 64,272 children in our sample for analysis.
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Health insurance status reflects coverage held during the round, typically the first four to five months of each calendar year. People are classified as uninsured only if they were continuously without coverage during the entire round. Some people had both public and private coverage (either simultaneously or at different time periods during the round).
We measure earnings from all jobs held during the interview week. Our earnings measure thereby corresponds as closely as possible to the period during which we measure insurance coverage. To measure unearned income from interest, dividends, Social Security, and pensions, we link MEPS to the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS). 22 Our estimate of assets is obtained by capitalizing interest and dividend income flows using the average return on 6-month certificates of deposit (U.S. Census Bureau 2003, Table 1168 ).
Simulating Program Eligibility
Simulated eligibility plays a central role in our analysis. Our method extends the approach in Selden, Banthin, and Cohen (1998) . Eligibility is simulated for public insurance by applying program, state, and year-specific rules governing: assistance unit composition, deeming of income, minor parent restrictions, age (including eligibility of 18-year-olds), income disregards, gross income tests, net income tests, asset tests, immigrant eligibility, 23 and (cash) benefit calculations for each year. 24 In all cases, we have attempted to simulate the rules as they would be applied to new applicants.
We simulate eligibility for public coverage in three broad groups, beginning with welfarerelated Medicaid eligibility, including family Medicaid coverage under Section 1931 of the Social Security Act (1996) . Also included in this group are children eligible for the Ribicoff Children program, 25 Medicaid medically needy coverage, and separate state-funded programs designed to replace welfare-related Medicaid coverage for nonqualifying immigrant families.
We next simulate the poverty-related Medicaid expansions for children. The federally mandated component of these expansions extended eligibility to children born after Sept. 30, 1983 , in families below the federal poverty guidelines, as well as children under age 6 in families below 133% of the poverty guidelines. Many states also extended coverage to older children and to children in families with higher incomes. Children in this group also include those eligible for free Medicaid coverage conferred through waivers approved under Section 1115 or Section 1902(r)(2) of the Social Security Act.
Finally, SCHIP eligibility is simulated using state-by-state rules for both separate SCHIP and combined Medicaid-SCHIP expansion programs. We also include in this group children eligible for public coverage via other non-SCHIP state programs that require a (subsidized) premium. In doing so, we recognize that some states had moved to expand coverage in advance of SCHIP, providing coverage to children who were later targeted by SCHIP.
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To construct our IV estimates, we run each child in each year of the MEPS through the simulation 51 times, once for each state plus the District of Columbia, applying each state's eligibility rules for that year. We then take averages within cells by age, state, year, predicted poverty, nativity and race. We also use the simulation model to identify several groups of children for the difference-in-trends analyses. To construct our SCHIP treatment and control groups, we run all children through the simulation model two times, first applying only the 1996 rules, then applying only the 2002 rules. 27 Those ineligible under the 1996 rules and eligible under the 2002 rules are the SCHIP treatment group. Children never eligi-ble constitute one of our control groups. Finally, we define a treatment group of children eligible through Medicaid's poverty-related expansions in both 1996 and 2002 for studying changes in coverage and crowd-out on the intensive margin associated with improved outreach. 28 Uninsurance declined by more than three percentage points from 16.4% to 13.1%. The prevalence of private coverage initially increased, rising by 3% between 1996 and 1998 (right-hand scale). It fell thereafter, ending up about one percentage point lower in 2002 than in 1996 (not a significant decrease).
Results
To gain a better perspective on these unadjusted trends, Figure 4 subsets the population to children in families between 100% and 300% of the poverty line. About 83% of the children made eligible from the 1996 to 2002 expansions fall within this poverty range. Public coverage increased substantially among children in this poverty group, rising by 11.8 percentage points. This rise was largely offset, however, by an 8.5-percentage-point decline in private coverage (which indeed fell 10.8 percentage points from its peak in 1998). Uninsurance declined by 2.5 percentage points, but this change was statistically insignificant.
These unadjusted trends are consistent with substantial amounts of crowd-out. But they are also consistent with other explanations. Between 1996 and 2002, total premiums for employmentrelated family coverage rose by 49.1% in real terms, and employees' out-of-pocket premium contributions for family coverage rose by 36.9%. 29 Had the 1996 to 2002 expansions not occurred, it is entirely plausible that private coverage might have declined anyway, with the result being a rise in uninsurance (rather than the rise in public coverage that we observe). To help untangle these competing explanations, we turn first to our difference-in-trends estimates.
Difference-in-Trends Estimates
Our DT estimates compare coverage trends between two treatment groups (the children targeted by the 1996-2002 expansions in SCHIP and those targeted by earlier expansions in Medicaid) and two control groups. As explained earlier, the DT approach depends heavily on choosing appropriate control groups. Thus, it is important to find people who are similar to those in the treatment population, yet not affected by the policy change. Our two control groups are: children age 18 and younger who live in families with incomes between 300% and 500% of poverty and who are ineligible for public insurance; and adult married women with no children under age 19 who live in families below 500% of poverty (and are not pregnant). Using two control groups with alternating strengths and weaknesses increases our confidence in interpreting the final results of the DT model.
The top panel of Table 1 shows selected socioeconomic characteristics of our treatment and control groups in our MEPS sample, pooled across all years from 1996 through 2002. Comparing columns 1 and 2, we see little difference in age and sex between our SCHIP treatment group and our control group of children. There are much larger differences, however, with respect to race/ethnicity, having two parents, adult educational attainment, adult employment, and poverty level.
The bottom panel of Table 1 shows insurance coverage by group in 1996 and 2002. Again, we see large coverage differences across groups in 1996, prior to the expansions. This is not surprising given the socioeconomic differences across groups in the top panel. There is an 11.4 percentage-point increase in public coverage in the SCHIP treatment group, combined with a decline in private coverage of five percentage points and a decline in uninsurance of 5.4%. 30 In contrast to the children targeted by SCHIP, both control groups exhibit relatively flat coverage trends over time. If sharply rising premiums had a negative effect on private coverage for these groups, that effect was approximately offset by increased employment opportunities seen in the late 1990s. We also see in Table 1 that public coverage was 17.2% in the treatment group in 1996 when the entire treatment group was simulated to be ineligible, and 9.1% among the control group of women. These numbers are not unusually large for this type of analysis, but highlight our concerns about simulation errors.
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Table 2 presents our main DT coverage estimates. In each case, our focus is on the treatment*trend coefficient showing the differential changes in coverage between 1996 and 2002 in the treatment and control groups. Each of the models also includes controls for age, sex, race, region, urban/rural status, as well as family-level variables on size, structure, poverty, education, employment, immigration, and interview language, and county-level measures of Table 2 are available from the authors upon request.) Focusing first on the top left panel, children targeted by SCHIP have significantly larger increases in public coverage than the control group of never-eligible children, combined with significantly larger declines in private coverage and uninsurance. The associated crowd-out rate estimate is 56%. This is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, yet the 95% confidence interval is large -spanning a range from 14% to 98% crowd-out. This crowd-out estimate is not significantly larger than the 43.6% crowd-out rate (not shown in table) that we obtain from a model containing only treatment, trend, and treatment*trend.
It is tempting to interpret the treatment*trend coefficients in Table 2 as the change in coverage associated with making a child in the treatment group eligible for public insurance. Consider, however, whether the public coverage equation yields a reasonable estimate of the enrollment rate among newly eligible children. Administrative data show SCHIP enrollment in the first quarter of calendar year 2002 was 3.8 million children. 33 Combining this with our estimate that 15 million children were eligible for SCHIP in the first part of 2002, 34 we have an approximate enrollment rate benchmark of 25%. This is substantially higher than our DT public coverage effect of 8.9%. The likely explanation is that the pre-treatment and control groups both included children with public coverage for all of the reasons described previously. We believe the DT estimates should not be interpreted as unbiased estimators of the effect of conferring eligibility on a formerly ineligible child. They are best interpreted as measuring the effect of extending eligibility to a group of children, some of whom might already have been enrolled in public coverage due to lower family income in the past or other programs we have not simulated. As discussed in the ''Methodology'' section, these concerns apply less forcefully to crowd-out estimates, which are computed as ratios in which attenuation bias factors cancel out (under the independence assumption). The lower panel of Table 2 presents DT estimates for our control group of women. One advantage of this control group is that it poses fewer concerns about either simulation error or spillover effects. Perhaps for this reason, we observe a somewhat larger expansion effect of 10.9% in the public coverage equation compared to that found using the control group of nevereligible children. We also find a larger effect of 5.2% on decreasing uninsurance when using the control group of women; however, the differences in the point estimates across the two control groups are not statistically significant. Using the control group of women, the crowd-out rate is 46%, with a 95% confidence interval of À1% to 93%. Although the crowd-out point estimate is 10 percentage points lower than when we use the control group of children, both crowd-out estimates are highly imprecise and the difference between them is not statistically significant.
The right hand panel of Table 2 presents estimates from the models using children targeted for poverty-related expansions in Medicaid as the treatment group. We know that take-up of public coverage rose in this group, and our hope is that DT estimates may offer insights into whether this increased take-up came by reducing uninsurance or by reducing private coverage. When using the control group of never-eligible children (top right panel), the model suggests that public coverage increased differentially in the treatment group by 8.3 percentage points, with uninsurance declining by 6.3 percentage points. Private coverage also may have declined, although the effect is not statistically significant. The resulting crowd-out rate for this specification is 29%, but the effect is very imprecisely estimated. The 95% confidence interval ranges from À45% to 103%. The corresponding estimates using our control group of women (bottom right panel) give somewhat higher increases in public coverage, somewhat bigger declines in uninsurance, and a crowd-out rate of 25% (with no appreciable increase in precision). The uninsurance effects and the crowd-out estimates are not, however, statistically different from those same estimates when using the control group of never-eligible children. Gathering these results together, our point estimates suggest that crowd-out on the intensive margin among Medicaid expansion-eligible children is less than on the extensive margin of SCHIP-eligible children. These results highlight the importance of ongoing efforts to enroll eligible uninsured children. Efforts to increase take-up among eligible children may not only strengthen the safety net for children in greatest need, but also may do so with lower levels of crowd-out than would be entailed with further expansions in eligibility thresholds. Note, however, that while these differences in crowd-out between the two treatment groups are suggestive, they are not statistically significant.
In Table 3 we test the sensitivity of the DT estimates with respect to the poverty ranges used to define the control groups. 35 In all cases, the differential increases in public coverage in the treatment groups are quite robust across alternative specifications. The same is largely true for uninsurance. Results using the control group of women are remarkably stable across all insurance outcomes, in all specifications. The area of greatest sensitivity involves the inclusion of higherincome children, which tends to diminish the treatment group's differential decline in private coverage, resulting in lower crowd-out estimates. 36 In particular, shifting the control group from never-eligible children between 300% and 500% of poverty to never-eligible children between 400% and 600% of poverty reduces the crowd-out rate to 19% for our SCHIP treatment group and À9% in our poverty-related treatment group. 37 Clearly, our crowd-out estimates are sensitive to rather arbitrary changes in our control group of never-eligible children. Table 4 presents our IV estimates with the age* state*year*predicted poverty*nativity*race eligibility instrument. The models include instrumented program eligibility along with: dummy variables for state, year, age, sex, decile of predicted poverty, urban/rural status, and race; family-level variables on size, structure, education, employment, immigration, and interview language; and county-level measures of employment-related family premiums and 10-year changes in the percentage of manufacturing jobs and white-collar jobs. 38 For ease of presentation, we only report estimated eligibility effects. (Complete regression results are available from authors upon request.)
Instrumental Variables
The first row in Table 4 presents estimates for all children in years 1996-2002. Children made eligible for public insurance were 11% less likely to be uninsured, 27% more likely to have public coverage, and 14% less likely to have private coverage. 39 These estimates are substantially larger in magnitude than our DT estimates -as one would expect based on concerns over simulation error. It is also noteworthy that the IV approach yields an eligibility effect in the public coverage equation that is virtually the same as the benchmark SCHIP enrollment rate of 25%. Taking the negative ratio of eligibility effects from the public and private coverage equations (Àb 3 PRIV /b 3 PUB ) gives us a crowd-out estimate of 53%. This is statistically different from zero at the 1% level, but the associated confidence interval is large, ranging from 32% to 73%.
These IV estimates essentially compare changes in insurance status among children affected by the expansions to coverage changes among all remaining children (including highincome children who were never eligible as well as those who were eligible before the expansions). Our concern is that some of these children may be less suitable than others as a comparison population. Those in high-income families clearly have different insurance options than children targeted by the 1996-2002 expansions. Poor children who were already eligible are likely to be an even less appropriate comparison group. For these reasons the second row of Table 4 follows LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004) in presenting IV estimates where we subset to children in families between 100% and 300% of poverty. 40, 41 Restricting the sample in this manner yields coverage effects that are substantially smaller in magnitude than those for all children with a decrease in uninsurance of 6.2% and an increase in public coverage of 13.2%. The associated crowd-out estimate of 39% is within the range found by LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004) . 42 However, the standard error is nearly three times greater than in the model with all children and the 95% confidence interval ranges from À18% to 95%.
Another concern with using the IV approach over this time period involves the enrollment lags seen in the SCHIP program. While variation in program start dates is a potentially useful source of identification in our model, we fear that children who gained income eligibility in early years of the program may have been slow to enroll. Because the IV model implicitly assumes instantaneous responses to changes in eligibility, we also ran the model dropping the first two years of the SCHIP program, 1998 and 1999, in an effort to obtain longer-run effects and remove some of the noise associated with its slow startup. The third row of Table 4 shows the effect of dropping these two transition years. The coverage effects are similar to those in the all-children specification, with a decrease in uninsurance of 12.5% and an increase in public coverage of 24.2%. The crowd-out estimate falls to 42% and has a 95% confidence interval of 17% to 67%. The final row of Table 4 shows the effect of reducing the income range and dropping the first two years of SCHIP. The coverage effects all decline in magnitude, and the private coverage effect switches sign. The associated crowd-out estimate is negative with a dramatic loss of precision.
Sensitivity to Use of Linear Probability Models
The DT and IV estimates presented here rely on linear probability (LP) specifications, whereby conditional coverage probabilities are assumed to be approximately linear in ELIG and X. A straightforward specification check is to calculate the frequency of predictions below zero or greater than one. Unfortunately, the IV-LP and DT-LP models all yield large concentrations of negative predictions.
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High negative prediction rates led us to reestimate the IV and DT models using discrete choice models. For IV, we estimated a linear first-stage equation for eligibility (ELIG) . 44 In the second stage, we estimated a bivariate probit (P) model where the two dependent variables are public coverage and private coverage and where (0,0) is the outcome for uninsured children. Although the IV-P model avoids predicted values outside the [0,1] range, the assumption of linearity in probit propensities is just as arbitrary as the assumption of linearity in probabilities. Moreover, whereas IV-LP overcorrects for simulation error, the properties of IV-P in this regard are not well understood. Table 5 presents a comparison of IV-LP and IV-P. The IV-P coverage effects are approximately half the magnitude of those from IV-LP, while the uninsurance effect of 1.9% is only one-fifth the magnitude found in the linear specification. IV-P eligibility effects in the public coverage model are far below the SCHIP enrollment benchmark of 25%. This reduction in eligibility effects is slightly larger in the public coverage equation than in the private coverage equation; hence IV-P yields a higher crowd-out rate than IV-LP (not a significant difference).
We encountered considerably greater difficulty in estimating a DT discrete choice model. We estimated a bivariate probit for public or private coverage containing the trend, treatment, and treatment*trend variables (along with the same vector of explanatory variables). We then constructed marginal effects by turning on and off the trend and treatment indicators (and their interaction), forming the average differencein-differences across these four predicted probabilities within our treatment group. 45 This approach, however, yields wrongly Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted to account for the complex design of the survey. Standard errors for all crowdout estimates and for bivariate probit insurance status estimates were calculated using balanced repeated replication. Models include controls for year, state, age, race, decile of predicted poverty, urban/rural status, county unemployment rate, county average insurance premium for family coverage, percent employed in manufacturing jobs in county, percent employed in white collar jobs in county, family size, family structure, highest education in family and immigration status of family members. a Sample results repeated from Table 4 . * Significantly different than zero at the 1% level or higher. ** Significantly different than zero at the 2% level. *** Significantly different than zero at the 5% level. Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted to account for the complex design of the survey. Standard errors for crowd-out were calculated using balanced repeated replication. Model includes controls for year, state, age, race, decile of predicted poverty, urban/rural status, family size, family structure, highest education in family and immigration status of family members. * Significantly different than zero at the 1% level or higher. ** Significantly different than zero at the 2% level. *** Significantly different than zero at the 5% level.
signed and highly imprecise coverage effects for public coverage and for crowd-out (results not shown). Indeed, the TREATMENT*TREND coefficient in the public coverage equation is negative, so that the control group's increase in public coverage from 1.6% to 4.3% in the DT-P model is interpreted as a larger increase in latent propensity than the treatment group's increase in public coverage from 17.2% to 28.6%. Most researchers would view the treatment group's rise in public coverage as being larger than the control group's, but reaching such a conclusion involves an implicit assumption of linearity. Basically, the treatment and control groups begin the analysis with very different levels of public coverage and very different socioeconomic characteristics (see Table 1 ). When the treatment and control groups are so different, the functional form used to compare trends across groups clearly matters.
Discussion
This paper joins the growing literature seeking to measure the impact on children's health insurance of expanded eligibility for public coverage. Using data from the 1996 to 2002 MEPS, we examine the impact of eligibility on uninsurance, public coverage, and private coverage --along with the associated level of crowd-out. We consistently find evidence across alternative specifications that the 1996 to 2002 expansions were associated with increased public coverage and reduced uninsurance among children. In many specifications, we also find that expanded eligibility was associated with reduced private insurance --frequently resulting in high estimated crowd-out rates. We also find evidence suggesting that crowd-out on the intensive margin of poverty-related Medicaid take-up may have been lower than on the extensive margin of expansions under SCHIP. Combined, these results provide evidence that the expansions were successful at decreasing uninsurance among children and suggest yet another motivation for redoubling efforts to enroll already eligible Medicaid children.
Estimation Challenges
Sensitivity to specification. It is nevertheless important to recognize that our estimates are all highly sensitive to specification, varying by choice of model, sample studied, and assumptions on linearity. With respect to choice of models, instrumental variables models generally yield much larger eligibility effects than difference-in-trends models. In particular, instrumental variables linear probability estimation is the only method that yields increases in public coverage that are consistent with administrative benchmarks for SCHIP enrollment. These results are consistent with our prior beliefs that simulation error poses a major specification problem, especially in DT estimation. Interestingly, our crowd-out estimates seem less affected by simulation error, perhaps because bias terms cancel from the numerators and denominators of these ratios. With respect to our choice of samples, it greatly matters for both our IV and DT results whether we include all ineligible children or just those in certain income bands. Our DT results are also sensitive to our choice of children or married women without children as a control group, and our IV results are sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of the first two years of SCHIP. With respect to the assumption of linearity, we are concerned that linear probability and probit models yield very different results -especially for the DT models.
Imprecision of estimates. We face a more general problem that all models produce highly imprecise measures of crowd-out. Our most precise estimate of crowd-out has a 95% confidence interval of plus or minus 20 percentage points, and many of our other estimates yield confidence intervals that are even wider. The crowd-out standard errors we find are between four and 10 times larger than the standard errors on the underlying coefficient estimates. The other papers that provide standard errors for crowd-out find a similar result, with crowd-out standard errors of four to 22 times those on the underlying coefficient estimates (Blumberg, Dubay, and Norton 2000; Shore-Sheppard 2000) . Many published crowdout estimates would not be statistically significant if their standard errors were 10 times those of the underlying coefficient estimates, and even a factor of four would seriously reduce the results' economic and policy significance. Although the accumulated evidence using a number of different data sources does suggest that crowd-out exists, we believe that estimate precision remains an important concern for the literature as a whole and for our results in particular.
Identification. Finally, we are concerned that our IV models are identified using only a very small percentage of the overall variation in eligibility. IV estimates measure ''local average treatment effects'' associated only with children for whom conditional variation in the instrument is linked to change in eligibility (see for instance Angrist 2004) . The low partial R 2 s in our first-stage equations only exacerbate our concerns about the applicability of these estimates to the broader population of newly eligible children. We also are concerned that reliance on such a small percentage of the overall eligibility variation for identification may magnify bias if state eligibility thresholds and their implications for eligibility are correlated with unmeasured trends in coverage.
Preferred Specifications
Balancing these concerns, we find some preferred specifications. In measuring the direct impact of expansions on the likelihood of children's insurance coverage, the instrumental variables linear probability model may yield more accurate estimates than the difference-in-trends model because IV better controls for endogeneity and simulation errors in eligibility. The IV-LP estimates can be interpreted as changes in coverage associated with making a child newly eligible for public coverage. Our preferred IV-LP specification drops 1998 and 1999 from the sample to address concerns regarding slow initial SCHIP enrollment rates. 46 Changes in eligibility in this model increased the likelihood of public coverage for newly eligible children by 24.2% and decreased uninsurance by 12.5%. While the magnitudes and interpretation may differ across other models (DT) or other specifications within IV, it is noteworthy that we consistently find statistically significant decreases in uninsurance and increases in public coverage associated with the 1996-2002 expansions.
Alternatively, when the measure of interest is the crowd-out rate, neither IV-LP nor DT-LP dominates. Crowd-out estimates may be less sensitive to simulation error to the extent that bias in the coverage estimates cancel out when calculating the crowd-out ratio. Among the DT models, our preferred specification uses married childless women as a control group. These women had similar trends in coverage to the treatment group in the pre-expansion period and had surprisingly robust results across varying income levels. The crowd-out rate associated with this DT specification is 48.5% and is remarkably similar to the 42.1% crowd-out from our preferred IV-LP model. However, both models produce highly imprecise measures of crowd-out. On this dimension, IV-LP fares better with a 95% confidence interval of plus or minus 25 percentage points versus 40 percentage points in DT.
Policy Implications
Our analysis of MEPS shows that expansions in eligibility between 1996 and 2002 were successful in their goal of reducing uninsurance among children, with significant impacts on coverage for children targeted by SCHIP as well as those children targeted by the earlier poverty-related Medicaid expansions. We also find evidence to suggest that some degree of crowd-out may have occurred as a result of expanded eligibility in this time period. However, the imprecision and lack of robustness of crowd-out measures in our analysis make it difficult to quantify the precise extent of this effect and raise concerns about other published estimates. As a result, we believe it is difficult to draw economic and policy significance from estimates of crowd-out and caution policymakers from interpreting any estimate of crowd-out as a definitive measure.
Additionally, we believe that crowd-out worries have the potential to distract the policy debate from its more appropriate focus on net benefits. Whereas there have been extensive efforts to quantify the extent of crowd-out, far less attention has been paid to quantifying the associated changes in net welfare. 47 Certainly our analysis shows evidence that expanded eligibility was associated with reductions in uninsurance. One side effect appears to be that some children substitute public for private coverage. Nevertheless, a more complete analysis should consider the potential benefits to these children and their families from lower premium and out-of-pocket expenditure burdens and perhaps improved access. Moreover, one must consider the public cost of crowd-out net the sizable public subsidies to private premiums, and net the costs of providing coverage to high-cost children whose private insurance is incomplete.
Finally, it is noteworthy that Medicaid and SCHIP together have been successful in reducing uninsurance among children to levels that have not been seen since the late 1970s (Monheit and Cunningham 1992; Cunningham and Kirby 2004) . Although crowd-out may have increased the costs of achieving these gains, the relevant issue for those who believe children should have health insurance is whether alternative policy solutions exist that could have covered this number of children at lower cost. Thus, we believe it is important that crowd-out be seen as only one, imperfectly measured aspect of designing public policies for enhancing child and family welfare.
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The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and no official endorsement by the Department of Health and Human Services or the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality is intended or should be inferred. Lave et al. 1998a; Manski, Edelstein, and Moeller 2001) . In 1987, more than half of the uninsured children with asthma and one-third of those with chronic ear infections were not seen by a physician during the year, raising concerns over preventable hospitalizations and the risk of permanent damage (Monheit and Cunningham 1992) . More recently, Davidoff et al. (2000) showed that Medicaideligible children who do not enroll have reduced access to care and live in families facing significant health-related financial burdens and important financial barriers to care. Compared to parents of insured children, parents of uninsured children were seven times more likely not to fill or to delay filling prescriptions in 2001, and seven times as many uninsured children went without needed health services due to financial barriers as did insured children (Covering Kids 2001) . Health insurance coverage can also facilitate participation in normal childhood activities, such as participation in organized sports (Lave et al. 1998b Yazici and Kaestner (2000) ; Blumberg, Dubay, and Norton (2000) ; Shore-Sheppard, Buchmueller and Jensen (2000) ; and Ham and Shore-Sheppard (2001) . 5 For concerns about SCHIP crowd-out see Cutler and Gruber (1996b) and Lutzky and Hill (2001) . For estimates of SCHIP crowd-out see LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004) . 6 Throughout the paper we use the terms ''1996 to 2002 expansions'' and ''SCHIP expansions'' interchangeably, even though a small portion of these expansions were unrelated to SCHIP. 7 These increases in take-up are generally attributed to improved outreach and reduced barriers to enrollment. The federal role in this initiative is described in White House (1998) . For more on outreach efforts during the early 1990s, see Cutler and Gruber (1997) . Current outreach and related efforts are described in National Governors' Association (2003) and Ross and Cox (2003) . 8 Our methods discussion focuses on pooled crosssectional data. For estimation approaches using longitudinal data see Blumberg, Dubay, and Norton (2000) and Ham and Shore-Sheppard (2001) . 9 The true false-negative rate might be even higher because for every simulated ineligible child with public coverage, there may also be other simulated ineligible children who in fact were eligible, but did not enroll. The computation of bias also depends on: the R 2 ¼ .51 from regressing ELIG on the other explanatory variables, and the mean of ELIG, which we approximate using the simulated eligibility rate of .23 (see Card 1996) . 10 Evidence on employer responses to expanded public eligibility is mixed. Cutler and Gruber (1996b) and Shore-Sheppard, Buchmueller, and Jensen (2000) found no evidence of reduced offers (although the former cannot rule out large effects in either direction). In contrast, Buchmueller et al. (2005) found evidence that employers in low-wage markets raise employee premiums for family coverage in response to expanded public eligibility. 11 For instance, researchers have used low-income single adult males as controls to examine the effects of the poverty-related Medicaid expansions on the coverage of pregnant women (Dubay and Kenney 1997) and children (Shore-Sheppard 2000) . Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004) used differences in Medicaid income thresholds among children born before and after September 1983 to identify changes in coverage. Banthin and Selden (2003) compared coverage trends among children targeted by the Medicaid expansions to coverage trends among the older and higher-income children who would subsequently be targeted by SCHIP. 12 We also tested specifications where: POST was entered as the value of our simulated eligibility indicator and, the eligibility indicator was interacted with a set of dummies representing the number of years since SCHIP was implemented. Our results (not shown) were not sensitive to these changes. 13 The take-up rate equals the number of children with public coverage divided by the number who had public coverage or were uninsured. 14 Note, however, that in a replication of Cutler and Gruber (1996b) (2000) forms instruments at the region*year*decile level (noting that she obtained similar results using predicted deciles). We predict family income using a two-part model. Then we combine predicted income with family size to form predictions of income relative to the federal poverty guidelines. We use this to assign children to six predicted poverty groups (0% to 100%, 100% to 200%, 200% to 300%, 300% to 400%, 400% to 600%, and over 600% FPL). 18 See, for instance, the SCHIP enrollment totals at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/schip/enrollment. See also Selden, Hudson, and Banthin (2004) . 19 See, for instance, Frazis and Loewenstein (2003) and the references therein. Truly eligible children can only be simulated to be eligible (error ¼ 0) or ineligible (error ¼À1), whereas truly ineligible children can only be simulated to be ineligible (error ¼ 0) or eligible (error ¼ 1). 20 Because the crowd-out rate is a ratio of two potentially correlated normal random variables, it has a complex distribution that has undefined expected value and variance and is possibly skewed (Hinckley 1969) . In practice, however, distributions of our balanced repeated replicate crowd-out estimates are not far from symmetric, so the standard errors and confidence intervals we present provide reasonable measures of sampling variability around the finite population crowd-out rate. Our method does not account for correlation (either contemporaneous or over time) across PSUs with states. Not all PSUs exist in our data for all years, thereby reducing the potential for this method to correct for autocorrelation. To assess this concern, we also constructed standard error estimates treating the state as the ''strata'' and the sampling strata as the PSU. This expands the range of covariation our standard errors capture yet had very little effect on our standard error estimates. Dubay, Haley, and Kenney (2002) . We run the simulation twice, first assuming all noncitizen children and family members are not legal and then assuming they are legal. We take a weighted average of these two outcomes using the probability that each person is legal or undocumented. Probabilities were kindly provided by Randolph Capps, Jeffrey Passel, and Kenneth Sucher of the Urban Institute (Passel and Clark 1998 Cutler and Gruber's (1996b) simulation, the pre-treatment frequency of public coverage among the children targeted by the 1987-1992 expansions is 21%. 32 We thank Lisa Dubay for providing us with family premium data (constructed from MEPS-IC employer-reported premium data and data on county business patterns). Other county-level variables were obtained from the Area Resource File. We also experimented with a wide range of other county-level variables, including unemployment rates, changes in population, poverty rates, and more. Our DT and IV results were remarkably robust with respect to the inclusion or exclusion of all county-level information we considered. We also ran regressions using state rather than region effects and found very similar results (with larger standard errors). 33 See http://www.cms.hhs.gov/schip/enrollment/ fy02sqer.pdf 34 So long as there is no systematic bias in income (and our income measure does track well with income from the Current Population Survey), then our simulation should yield reasonably close estimates of total SCHIP eligibility. 35 Coverage trends across these alternative income groups are comparable to those presented in Figures 3 and 4. Groups with higher incomes have greater levels of coverage but the rate of change is similar over time. 36 The changes in the private coverage coefficients are all statistically significant, whereas the crowd-out rates only differ significantly if we use a control group of children in families between 400% and 600% of poverty. 37 Only the SCHIP difference, however, is statistically significant. 38 Following Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004) , we also run a specification that includes a set of age by year dummy variables to control for differential trends in coverage over time for children of different ages (not shown). However, unlike Card and Shore-Sheppard, our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of these dummies. 39 These effects do not sum to zero, because children can hold both public and private coverage. 40 We select a somewhat wider poverty range than LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004) . Although the 100% to 200% poverty group is most intensively affected by the 1996 to 2002 expansions, we find that 30% of the newly eligible children were in families between 200% and 300% of poverty. By 2002, 26% of this higher poverty group had been made newly eligible through these expansions. 41 We also ran specifications for children between 150% and 300% of poverty to address concerns that children between 100% and 150% of poverty may have already been eligible (not shown). We find our point estimates are not sensitive to this change but lead to less precise estimates due to smaller sample size. 42 LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004) estimate a crowd-out rate between 18% and 50%. The midpoint of 34% is remarkably close to our estimate. They do not, however, present standard errors so the precision of their estimates is unknown. 43 In the DT-LP model with children controls, negative prediction rates are 3%, 17%, and 4% in the uninsured, public coverage, and private coverage equations, respectively (survey weighted). The negative prediction rate for public coverage in the control group is 30%. Negative prediction rates are somewhat higher for the treatment group of poverty-related Medicaid eligibles and somewhat lower in the models using the control group of women. In the all-children/all-years IV-LP model, negative prediction rates are 2%, 24%, and 1% in the uninsured, public coverage, and private coverage equations. The negative prediction rate for public coverage rises to 44% if we subset to children in families over 300% of poverty. 44 We obtained virtually identical results by estimating the first-stage equation using an (independent) discrete choice equation. 45 For more on interaction effects in nonlinear models, see Ai and Norton (2003) . 46 A priori, we prefer the specification that also limits the sample to low-income children in order to remove biases from comparing newly eligible children to children with very different insurance options. However, smaller samples sizes in the MEPS data lead to imprecise estimates for this population. 47 A notable exception is Holahan (1997) .
